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An Illusory Right to Appeal:
Substantial Constitutional
Questions at the New York Court
of Appeals
Meredith R. Miller*
Introduction
The jurisdiction of the New York Court of Appeals has long
been shrouded in mystery. When the court dismisses an
appeal, it provides a boilerplate, one-sentence decretal entry,
which gives the litigants little, if any, meaningful indication of
the court‟s reasons for dismissal. In February 2010, however,
the world received a rare glimpse into the court‟s jurisdiction
when, in Kachalsky v. Cacace,1 Judge Robert Smith dissented
from the court‟s sua sponte dismissal of the appeal.
Kachalsky involved an appeal questioning whether a state
law prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons is consistent
with the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The court dismissed the appeal for failure to raise a
“substantial constitutional question.”2 Judge Smith dissented
from the dismissal and voted to retain the appeal, arguing that
the court was using the requirement of “substantiality” to
invoke discretion it did not have on an appeal as of right.3
The court‟s civil jurisdiction generally covers two types of
cases: (1) those it hears “as of right” pursuant to Civil Practice
Law Rules (CPLR) 5601; and (2) those for which it has granted
permission to appeal pursuant to CPLR 5602. In Kachalsky,
Judge Smith opined that the definition of “substantiality” had
* Associate Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law
Center. I am grateful to Tanya Freeman and Syeda Ahmad for superb
research assistance.
1. 925 N.E.2d 80 (N.Y. 2010).
2. Id. at 80.
3. Id.
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become “so flexible” that it, in effect, conferred on the court
“discretion comparable to that we have in deciding whether to
grant permission to appeal under CPLR 5602.”4
In Kachalsky, Judge Smith pointed to a problematic policy.
Through the requirement of “substantiality,” the New York
Court of Appeals is granting itself discretion to determine
whether to hear certain appeals that ought to be “as of right.”
The justification for the requirement of “substantiality” is to
prevent the creativity of counsel in contriving constitutional
questions to gain the right to appeal. This Article argues that
this concern is overstated and, in any event, existing
limitations on appealability and reviewability serve to hinder
counsel from inventing frivolous constitutional questions for
the sake of an appeal. Moreover, an expansion of existing limits
on reviewability could further militate against such abuses.
As the court‟s policy presently stands, an appeal as of right
does not lie if the constitutional question is not directly
involved in the decision from which the appeal is taken. In
addition, issues that have not been preserved in the courts
below are not reviewable by the New York Court of Appeals.
Finally, in some instances, the court will only review the
constitutional question and none of the other issues in the case.
This Article argues that, in all appeals “as of right” based on a
constitutional question, the court‟s review should be limited to
the constitutional question raised.
Thus, this Article proposes elimination of the
“substantiality” requirement. The existing limits on
appealability and reviewability, as well as proposed, expanded
limits, serve to prevent counsel from manufacturing frivolous
constitutional issues for an appeal. The court‟s exercise of
discretion is not warranted and the current requirement of
“substantiality” effectively renders the right to appeal on
constitutional grounds an illusory one.
I. An Overview of the Court‟s Civil Jurisdiction
The civil jurisdiction of the New York Court of Appeals
generally includes two types of appeals: (1) those that it hears
4. Id.
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“as of right”;5 and (2) those where it has granted leave.6 The
most common appeals as of right are either premised upon a
double dissent at the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division,7 or a substantial constitutional question.8 Appeals as
of right on constitutional grounds are discussed in depth in
Section II.
Where an aggrieved litigant does not have an appeal as of
right, the appeal may be heard by permission of the appellate
division or the Court of Appeals.9 When a motion for leave is
made to the Court of Appeals, it requires the vote of two judges
to be granted.10 The judges assess typical certiorari factors,
such as whether the question of law is “novel or of public
importance, [or] present[s] a conflict with prior decisions of
[the] court, or involve[s] a conflict among the departments of
the Appellate Division.”11 The court, therefore, has wide
latitude to determine its civil docket. Indeed, in 2009, it
granted permission to appeal in only 7.2 percent of the 1,070
civil motions for leave.12
II. Appeals as of Right on Constitutional Grounds
The New York State Constitution13 and CPLR 5601(b)14
5. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601 (McKinney 2010).
6. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5602.
7. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601(a).
8. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601(b).
9. See generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5602.
10. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5602(a).
11. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 500.22(b)(4) (2008); see also 8
MARK DAVIES ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE § 15:5 (2010); id. §
15:3.
12. STUART M. COHEN, ANNUAL REPORT OF CLERK OF THE COURT TO THE
JUDGES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 6 (2009),
available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/news/annrpt/AnnRpt2009.PDF.
The Court denied 74.2% of civil motions for leave and dismissed 18.6% for
jurisdictional defects.
13. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(1) and (2) provides:
b. Appeals to the court of appeals may be taken in the
classes of cases hereafter enumerated in this section;
....
In civil cases and proceedings as follows:

3
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authorize an appeal as of right to the Court of Appeals on
constitutional grounds.15 This type of appeal is either: (1) from
a final determination of the appellate division where a
constitutional question is directly involved; or (2) directly from
a final determination of a court of original instance where the
only question involved is the constitutionality of a state or
federal statute (a “direct appeal”).16
When the appeal is from an appellate division judgment, it
is not required that the constitutional question challenge the
validity of a statute.17 On such an appeal from the appellate
(1) As of right, from a judgment or order entered upon
the decision of an appellate division of the supreme court
which finally determines an action or special proceeding
wherein is directly involved the construction of the
constitution of the state or of the United States, or where
one or more of the justices of the appellate division dissents
from the decision of the court, or where the judgment or
order is one of reversal or modification.
(2) As of right, from a judgment or order of a court of
record of original jurisdiction which finally determines an
action or special proceeding where the only question
involved on the appeal is the validity of a statutory
provision of the state or of the United States under the
constitution of the state or of the United States; and on any
such appeal only the constitutional question shall be
considered and determined by the court.
14. Tracking the language of the state constitution, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601
provides in pertinent part:
(b) Constitutional grounds. An appeal may be taken to
the court of appeals as of right:
1. from an order of the appellate division which finally
determines an action where there is directly involved the
construction of the constitution of the state or of the
United States; and
2. from a judgment of a court of record of original
instance which finally determines an action where the only
question involved on the appeal is the validity of a
statutory provision of the state or of the United States
under the constitution of the state or of the United
States.
15. ARTHUR KARGER, POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS § 7:1,
at 219-20 (3d ed. 2005).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 7:2, at 222; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601(b)(1).
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division, the Court of Appeals will consider all questions
properly within its jurisdiction, even those that do not raise
constitutional challenges.18 On a direct appeal from a court of
original instance, however, the constitutional question must
challenge the validity of a statute, and the court will consider
only that question on the appeal.19
In neither of these instances does the New York State
Constitution or the CPLR expressly require that the
constitutional question involved be “substantial.” Nevertheless,
whether the appeal is taken from the appellate division or is a
direct appeal, the Court of Appeals requires that the
constitutional question be a “substantial” one; otherwise, it will
not be heard on the merits. The origin of the substantiality
requirement is a judicial gloss, and while it has not been traced
back to an exact public pronouncement, dismissals for failure
to raise a “substantial constitutional question” appear in
decretal entries as early as the 1930s.20 Arthur Karger‟s
authoritative treatise on the court‟s jurisdiction notes that the
limitation is “firmly established.”21
Explaining the justification for the requirement of
substantiality, Karger provides:
It is an obviously necessary safeguard against
abuse of the right to appeal on constitutional
questions, for otherwise the right to appeal
would turn on the ingenuity of counsel in
advancing arguments on constitutional issues,
howsoever fanciful they might be.22
The standard of
defined in New York
different people.”23
substantiality has

“substantiality,” however, is nowhere
law and “can mean different things to
Consistent with its justification,
been described as requiring the

18. KARGER, supra note 15, § 7:2, at 223.
19. Id. at 222 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(2)).
20. See, e.g., Wynkoop Hallenback Crawford Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co.,
268 N.Y. 108 (1935); Karsten Dairies v. Baldwin, 269 N.Y. 566 (1935).
21. KARGER, supra note 15, § 7:5, at 226.
22. Id.
23. DAVIES ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE § 15:4.
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constitutional question to “appear to have colorable merit and
not to be advanced solely or primarily as the predicate for
appeal as of right.”24 In addressing what constitutes a
“substantial” constitutional question, Karger writes:
The standard of substantiality cannot, of course,
be defined with mechanical precision. Whether a
particular constitutional issue is sufficiently
substantial to warrant an appeal as of right is,
generally speaking, rather a matter of judgment,
to be determined on the facts of the individual
case.25
In defining substantiality, Karger references the United
States Supreme Court‟s standard for certiorari petitions.26
Another, significant limitation on the appealability of the
constitutional question is that it must be “directly involved” in
the order from which the appeal is taken. This requirement is
explicitly stated in New York Constitution, article VI, section
3(b), and CPLR 5601(b). Direct involvement is a strict
requirement, and it has been understood to require that the
constitutional question is “necessarily involved” in deciding the
case.27 That is, there cannot be another, non-constitutional
ground that independently supports the determination from
which the appeal is taken.28
If one of the jurisdictional predicates for an appeal as of
right pursuant to CPLR 5601 is not present, the appeal is
subject to dismissal upon motion or by the court sua sponte.29
When, on its own motion, the court dismisses an appeal as of
right which is purportedly on constitutional grounds, the

24. 9 JACK B. WEINSTEIN, HAROLD L. KORN & ARTHUR R. MILLER, NEW
YORK CIVIL PRACTICE: CPLR ¶ 5601.09 (2d ed. 2005).
25. KARGER, supra note 15, § 7:5, at 226.
26. Id.
27. Id. § 7:8, at 230.
28. Id. For direct appeals, remember, the only question involved can be
the constitutional challenge of a statute. Further, the clear implication is
“that [the question] shall have been „not only directly and necessarily
involved in the decision of the case.‟” Id.
29. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 500.10 (2008).
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Court‟s decretal entry routinely, simply states: “Appeal
dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte,
upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is
directly involved.”30 Ordinarily, no further information is
provided concerning the dismissal of the appeal.
III. Kachalsky v. Cacace: The Illusory Appeal as of Right on
Constitutional Grounds
This standardized decretal entry usually fails to provide
any meaningful suggestion of the court‟s reasons for dismissal.
However, in February 2010, in Kachalsky,31 insight was gained
into the mystifying inner workings of the court. In that case,
the court dismissed the appeal sua sponte for failure to raise a
substantial constitutional question. Judge Robert Smith
dissented from the dismissal and voted to retain the appeal. In
so doing, Judge Smith challenged the other judges to consider
the proper contours of the substantiality requirement.
Petitioner Alan Kachalsky, a solo practitioner, wanted to
carry a concealed pistol for self-protection but knew it would be
a “long shot to get authorization.”32 When Judge Susan Cacace
denied Kachalsky‟s application, he commenced an article 78
proceeding to review the determination.33 The New York
Appellate Division, Second Department, confirmed the
determination and denied the petition, holding petitioner
“failed to demonstrate „proper cause‟ for the issuance of a „full
carry‟ permit” as required by the New York Penal Law.34
Further, it held that “respondent‟s determination was not
arbitrary or capricious.”35 The terse opinion did not address
any of petitioner‟s constitutional claims.
Apparently, however, on appeal to the New York Court of
30. See, e.g., Disimone v. Adler, 14 N.Y.3d 764 (2010); Sieger v. Sieger,
14 N.Y.3d 750 (2010); W. N.Y. Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Cullen, 13 N.Y.3d
904 (2009).
31. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 925 N.E.2d 80 (N.Y. 2010).
32. Joel Stashenko, Smith Takes Judges to Task for Failure to Find
Substantial Constitutional Issue in Gun Case, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 4, 2010.
33. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 884 N.Y.S.2d 877 (App. Div. 2009).
34. Id.
35. Id.
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Appeals, petitioner argued that the Penal Law violates the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.36
Namely, petitioner raised the following two issues: “(1) whether
the Second Amendment limits the powers of the states, as well
as of the federal government; and (2) whether a prohibition on
carrying concealed weapons without a showing of proper cause
is consistent with the Second Amendment.”37
In a rare written dissent38 from the court‟s dismissal of the
appeal, Judge Smith stated that the issues raised were
substantial.39 Judge Smith reasoned:
The first [issue] is of such great substance, and
current importance, that the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to consider it [McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 48 (2009)]. The second
issue, in light of [District of Columbia v. Heller,
128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008)], unquestionably presents
fair ground for litigation. On neither issue could
petitioner‟s case, by any remote stretch, be called
frivolous or fanciful.40
Judge Smith opined that the definition of “substantial” had
become “so flexible that it confers on us, in effect, discretion
comparable to that we have in deciding whether to grant
permission to appeal under CPLR 5602.”41
In so arguing, Judge Smith questioned whether the court
has such wide latitude in determining whether to retain an
appeal on constitutional grounds. He recognized that, if it had
discretion concerning whether to retain the appeal, there was
“a perfectly reasonable argument” for the Court to wait until
the United States Supreme Court decided McDonald.42
However, given that the appeal was as of right, Judge Smith
questioned whether the Court of Appeals had such discretion.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Kachalsky, 925 N.E.2d at 81-82.
Id. at 81.
Stashenko, supra note 32.
Kachalsky, 925 N.E.2d at 81.
Id.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 81.
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He wrote, “I would not quarrel with that exercise of discretion,
if I thought the discretion existed. I think, however, that
petitioner has a constitutional right to have us hear this
appeal, and that‟s all there is to it.”43
IV. Elimination of the Requirement of “Substantiality”
In his Kachalsky dissent, Judge Smith raises a serious
concern. The court is using the requirement of “substantiality”
to invoke discretion that it should not, by definition, have on
appeals as of right. This practice is reinforced by Karger‟s
authoritative treatise, which explains the requirement of
substantiality as akin to the standard for certiorari at the
United States Supreme Court.44 Through the requirement of
substantiality, the Court of Appeals has some measure of
discretion whether to retain an appeal on constitutional
grounds and, therefore, this type of appeal “as of right” is not
really “as of right.”
Neither the CPLR nor the New York State Constitution
requires that the constitutional question be “substantial.”45 If
the New York Legislature intended for the Court of Appeals to
have discretion on these appeals: (1) it would not have
described them as appeals “as of right” and, further, (2) there
would be no distinction between appeals as of right pursuant to
CPLR 5601 and motions for leave to appeal pursuant to CPLR
5602.
This invocation of discretion is problematic because it may
serve to deprive an aggrieved litigant of a proper appeal. In
addition, it is a way for the court to avoid addressing the merits
of difficult, politically charged issues. Indeed, the issue in
Kachalsky involved the highly politicized debate about the
scope of the federal constitutional right to bear arms. Further,
for example, other recent dismissals of appeals as of right
included constitutional issues affecting sex offender

43. Id.
44. KARGER, supra note 15, § 7:5, at 226.
45. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(1)-(2); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5601(b)(1)-(2) (McKinney 2010).
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commitment,46 state executive power,47 public school standards
and enrollment policies,48 marriage and domestic partnership
laws,49 public university funding,50 the state budget,51 and
judicial pay.52
The stated justification for invoking a requirement of
“substantiality” is to prevent counsel from crafting frivolous
constitutional claims to manufacture an appeal to the Court of
Appeals.53 This concern, however, is exaggerated. Likewise,
other existing and proposed safeguards could prevent frivolous
constitutional arguments without the court invoking discretion
that it should not have on these appeals.
From January 1990 to May 2010, New York‟s highest court
dismissed sua sponte 197 civil appeals “upon the ground that
46. Martin v. Goord, 845 N.Y.S.2d 524 (App. Div. 2007) (whether
Department of Correctional Services‟ standardization of sex offender
programs and resulting policy changes violated the ex post facto clause of
State or Federal Constitution), appeal dismissed, 883 N.E.2d 365 (N.Y. 2008).
47. McKinney v. Comm‟r of N.Y. State Dep‟t of Health, 840 N.Y.S.2d 6
(App. Div. 2007) (whether law authorizing State Department of Health to
reorganize hospitals and nursing homes unconstitutionally delegated
legislative authority to the executive branch), appeal dismissed, 874 N.E.2d
735 (N.Y. 2007).
48. Paynter v. State, 735 N.Y.S.2d 337 (App. Div. 2001) (whether
reliance on standardized test scores violates constitutional right to a sound
education), appeal dismissed, 771 N.E.2d 832 (N.Y. 2002) (Judge George
Bundy Smith and Judge Ciparick dissenting and voting to retain
jurisdiction).
49. Slattery v. City of New York, 697 N.Y.S.2d 603 (App. Div. 1999)
(whether New York City exceeded its authority in enacting domestic
partnership law), appeal dismissed, 727 N.E.2d 1253 (N.Y. 2000).
50. Weinbaum v. Cuomo, 631 N.Y.S.2d 825 (App. Div. 1995) (whether
disparate funding of CUNY and SUNY violated equal protection clause),
appeal dismissed, 664 N.E.2d 506 (N.Y. 1996) (Judge George Bundy Smith
dissented and voted to retain jurisdiction “on the ground that the allegations
of racial discrimination in the funding of City University of New York
[CUNY] and State University of New York [SUNY] present substantial
constitutional questions and support an appeal as of right . . . .”).
51. Schulz v. Silver, 629 N.Y.S.2d 316 (App. Div. 1995) (whether, absent
the passage of a budget and an emergency situation, any appropriations or
expenditures by the State Legislature are unconstitutional), appeal
dismissed, 658 N.E.2d 216 (N.Y. 1995).
52. Davis v. Rosenblatt, 559 N.Y.S.2d 401 (App. Div. 1990) (whether
disparity in wages among judges of various counties violates equal protection
clause of State and Federal Constitutions), appeal dismissed, Higgins v.
Rosenblatt, 567 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1991).
53. KARGER, supra note 15, § 7:5, at 226.
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no substantial constitutional question is directly involved.”54
This is an average of less than ten such dismissals per year—
with some years seeing as few as one or two such dismissals
and other years having more than twenty. Of those appeals, it
is difficult to discern from the decretal entry which were
dismissed for lack of substantiality and which were dismissed
because the constitutional question was not directly involved.
Nevertheless, a survey was undertaken of all 197 decisions on
the orders appealed from and dismissed during this twentyyear time frame. Of these decisions, a very insignificant
number (roughly forty-three)55 addressed a constitutional issue.
54. The quoted language is the wording of the boilerplate decretal entry
the Court uses to dismiss constitutional appeals sua sponte. Using these key
words, in May 2010, the following search query was performed in the
Westlaw database “NY-CS”: “COURT (HIGH) & DISMISSED /S APPEAL /S
“SUA SPONTE” /S “SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION” /S
INVOLVED & DATE (AFT 1989).” This search was, therefore, limited to sua
sponte dismissals.
During that same time, based upon the official reporter‟s summaries, the
Court appears to have retained roughly seventy-eight appeals on
constitutional grounds. In May 2010, the following search query was
performed in the Westlaw database “NY-ORCS”: “CO (HIGH) AND (APPEAL
/2 “CONSTITIONAL GROUNDS”) AND DATE (AFT 1989) % DISMISSED.”
This search includes constitutional question appeals that were not the
subject of a sua sponte dismissal inquiry and were, thus, decided on the
merits. There are, however, some limits to this search. First, it does not
include constitutional question appeals that were placed on sua sponte
dismissal track but were retained by the Court. Second, the search does not
include appeals on constitutional grounds that were not put on sua sponte
dismissal track but still did not proceed to disposition on the merits (e.g.,
dismissals for failure to timely perfect). It is believed that the number of such
cases, if there are any, is very small. Also, the search is based on decision
dates and not filing dates; therefore, the results may include cases filed
before 1990 but decided after. Again, however, this would be a very small
number of decisions.
My gratitude extends to Stuart Cohen, Frances Murray and James
Costello for helping craft the search and informing me of its limitations.
55. See Madireddy v. Madireddy, 886 N.Y.S.2d 495 (App. Div. 2009),
appeal dismissed, 925 N.E.2d 96 (N.Y. 2010); W. N.Y. Land Conservancy, Inc.
v. Cullen, 886 N.Y.S.2d 303 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 922 N.E.2d 880
(N.Y. 2009); Attea v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 883 N.Y.S.2d 610 (App. Div.),
appeal dismissed, 918 N.E.2d 955 (N.Y. 2009); Potter v. Town Bd. of Aurora,
875 N.Y.S.2d 414 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 910 N.E.2d 1006 (N.Y. 2009);
Mill River Club, Inc. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 873 N.Y.S.2d 167
(App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 910 N.E.2d 428 (N.Y. 2009); In re Bishop, 863
N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 2008), appeal dismissed, 906 N.E.2d 1079 (N.Y. 2009);
Friendly Car Wash Main Street, Inc. v. Comm‟r of Labor, No. 504440, 2009
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WL 105107 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 5, 2009), appeal dismissed, 906 N.E.2d 1065
(N.Y. 2009); In re Land Master Montg I, LLC 863 N.Y.S.2d 692 (App. Div.),
appeal dismissed, 900 N.E.2d 551 (N.Y. 2008); Syndicated Commc'n Venture
Partners IV, LP v. BayStar Capital, L.P., 859 N.Y.S.2d 125 (App. Div.),
appeal dismissed, 896 N.E.2d 85 (N.Y. 2008); Junk'n Doughnuts Inc. v. Dep't
of Consumer Affairs of New York, 855 N.Y.S.2d 59 (App. Div.), appeal
dismissed, 892 N.E.2d 856 (N.Y. 2008); Kosich v. State Dept. of Health, 854
N.Y.S.2d 551 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 892 N.E.2d 856 (N.Y. 2008);
Leyse v. Domino's Pizza LLC, 853 N.Y.S.2d 38 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed,
892 N.E.2d 395 (N.Y. 2008); Marino v. Kahn, 855 N.Y.S.2d 560 (App. Div.),
appeal dismissed, 892 N.E.2d 395 (N.Y. 2008); Kessler v. Hevesi, 846
N.Y.S.2d 56 (App. Div. 2007), appeal dismissed, 889 N.E.2d 489 (N.Y. 2008);
Graham v. Dunkley, 852 N.Y.S.2d 169 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 889
N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 2008); Davenport v. Stein, 845 N.Y.S.2d 253(App. Div.
2007), appeal dismissed, 886 N.E.2d 789 (N.Y. 2008); Martin v. Goord, 845
N.Y.S.2d 524 (App. Div. 2007), appeal dismissed, 883 N.E.2d 365 (N.Y. 2008);
Love‟M Sheltering, Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 824 N.Y.S.2d 98 (App. Div.
2006), appeal dismissed, 881 N.E.2d 1198 (N.Y. 2008); Street Vendor Project
v. City of New York, 841 N.Y.S.2d 79 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 879
N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 2007); St. Joseph Hosp. of Cheetowaga. v. Novello, 840
N.Y.S.2d 263 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 878 N.E.2d 606 (N.Y. 2007);
DiFrancesco v. County of Rockland, 839 N.Y.S.2d 105 (App. Div.), appeal
dismissed, 877 N.E.2d 296 (N.Y. 2007); McKinney v. Comm‟r of N.Y. State
Dep‟t of Health, 840 N.Y.S.2d 6 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 874 N.E.2d 735
(N.Y. 2007); Festa v. N.Y.C. Dep‟t of Consumer Affairs, 37 A.D.3d 343 (1st
Dep‟t), appeal dismissed, 9 N.Y.3d 858 (2007); In re Estate of Rose BB, 35
A.D.3d 1044 (3d Dep‟t 2006), appeal dismissed, 8 N.Y.3d 936 (2007); Kaplan
v. Julian, 35 A.D.3d 1291 (4th Dep‟t 2006), appeal dismissed, 8 N.Y.3d 395
(2007); Cobos v. Dennison, 34 A.D.3d 1325 (4th Dep‟t 2006), appeal
dismissed, 8 N.Y.3d 851 (2007); In re Guardianship of Chantel Nicole R., 34
A.D.3d 99 (1st Dep‟t 2006), appeal dismissed, 8 N.Y.3d 840 (2007); Landsman
v. Village of Hancock, 296 A.D.2d 728 (3d Dep‟t), appeal dismissed, 99 N.Y.2d
529 (2002); Paynter v. Stone, 290 A.D.2d 95 (4th Dep‟t 2001), appeal
dismissed, 98 N.Y.2d 644 (Smith, J. and Ciparick, J. dissent and vote to
retain jurisdiction); DiRose v. N.Y. State Dep‟t of Corr. Servs., 276 A.D. 842
(3d Dep‟t 2000), appeal dismissed, 96 N.Y.2d 850 (2001); MacFarlane v.
Village of Scotia, 241 A.D.2d 574 (3d Dep‟t 1997), appeal dismissed, 95
N.Y.2d 930 (2000); Santiago v. Bristol, 273 A.D.2d 813 (4th Dep‟t), appeal
dismissed, 95 N.Y.2d 827 (2000); Slattery v. City of New York, 266 A.D.2d 24
(1st Dep‟t 1999), appeal dismissed, 94 N.Y.2d 897 (2000); Children‟s Vill. v.
Greenburgh Eleven Teachers‟ Union Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1532, 685
N.Y.S.2d 754 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 716 N.E.2d 178 (N.Y. 1999);
Helgans v. Plurad, 680 N.Y.S.2d 648 (App. Div. 1998), appeal dismissed, 711
N.E.2d 639 (N.Y. 1999); Gulotta v. State, 645 N.Y.S.2d 41 (App. Div.), appeal
dismissed, 674 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y. 1996); Weinbaum v. Cuomo, 631 N.Y.S.2d
825 (App. Div. 1995), appeal dismissed, 664 N.E.2d 506 (N.Y. 1996); Kraebel
v. N.Y.C. Dep‟t of Fin., 629 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 658
N.E.2d 216 (N.Y. 1995); Schulz v. Silver, 629 N.Y.S.2d 316 (App. Div.), appeal
dismissed, 658 N.E.2d 216 (N.Y. 1995); Penfield Tax Protest Grp. v. Yancey,
621 N.Y.S.2d 256 (App. Div. 1994), appeal dismissed, 650 N.E.2d 1318 (N.Y.
1995); In re Rowe, 595 N.Y.S.2d 499 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 625
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Further, of those roughly forty-three decisions that did
address a constitutional issue, most also raised nonconstitutional issues, suggesting that some of the appeals were
dismissed on the ground that the constitutional question was
not directly involved. Because the court publicly issues only the
one-sentence decretal, it is difficult to know just how many of
these appeals were dismissed for lack of substantiality—but
even if all of them were dismissed on this basis, it only
amounts to about forty-three appeals in the course of twenty
years. This is hardly a floodgate of work for the court.
Further, the roughly 154 remaining decisions from which
an appeal was taken did not address or did not involve a
discernible constitutional issue. This would appear to suggest
that the constitutional questions raised on these appeals were
either not raised below or not directly involved (after all, if the
decision below does not mention any constitutional issues, the
decision very likely rests on other, independent, nonconstitutional grounds).
Given the elusive nature of the court‟s one-sentence
decretal, it is admittedly a very limited gauge to review the
decisions from which appeals were taken to assess whether the
appellants raised a substantial constitutional issue in the
courts below. Indeed, the decision on the appellate division
order appealed from in Kachalsky did not address any
constitutional issues.56 Nevertheless, the decisions are a
window into what types of issues are being raised and
addressed in the courts before the appeal is taken to the Court
of Appeals.
That said, it simply does not appear that the Court of
Appeals would be overburdened if the “substantiality”
requirement were eliminated. Certainly, one might argue that
the reason that there are only 197 such dismissals in the past
twenty years is because of the substantiality requirement; in
other words, it could be argued that there is an insignificant
number of these appeals because the hurdle of substantiality
N.E.2d 587 (N.Y. 1993); Duffy v. Wetzler, 579 N.Y.S.2d 684 (App. Div.),
appeal dismissed, 592 N.E.2d 798 (1992); Davis v. Rosenblatt, 599 N.Y.S.2d
401 (App. Div. 1990), appeal dismissed, Higgens v. Rosenblatt, 567 N.E.2d
976 (N.Y. 1991).
56. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 884 N.Y.S.2d 877 (App. Div. 2009).
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dissuades litigants from attempting an appeal as of right.
However, the requirement of substantiality could actually have
the opposite effect of incentivizing more frivolous appeals. To
the extent that “substantiality” imbues the court with
discretion, and most attorneys lack a solid understanding of
the intricacies of the court‟s jurisdiction, they are arguably
more likely to file an appeal as of right—after all, they might
perceive that there is a slight chance the court will exercise its
discretion and retain the appeal. “Substantiality” is a standard,
which Karger observes is “not defined with mechanical
precision.”57 The uncertainty of such a vast grey area, combined
with a general ignorance of the technicalities of the court‟s
jurisdiction, is likely to lead to more appeals, not less.58
There are intellectually honest ways for the court to
prevent frivolous appeals on invented constitutional grounds
without invoking discretion that it is not technically granted by
statute or New York State Constitution. First and foremost, the
requirement that the constitutional question is “directly
involved” is expressly stated in both the CPLR and the State
Constitution.59 As discussed, this strict requirement appears to
dispose of many, if not most, of the purported appeals as of
right on constitutional grounds. Of course, given that the
court‟s decretal entry does not decode whether the dismissal is
for lack of substantiality or because the question is not directly
involved, it is admittedly difficult to make any hard and fast
pronouncements, other than the law and the public would
benefit from less cryptic entries from the New York Court of
Appeals.
Second, to the extent there is concern that litigants will
manufacture constitutional issues to get the appeal heard “as
of right,” limitations on reviewability serve to stem this abuse.
Significantly, the court‟s power of review is limited to those

57. KARGER, supra note 15, § 7:5, at 226.
58. Further, one might argue that, if very few of the decisions appeal
from actually addressed a constitutional issue, perhaps this is evidence that a
constitutional issue is being manufactured for the purpose of bringing an
appeal. This argument is irrelevant because, if the issue is only first raised
on appeal, it is not preserved and, therefore, not reviewable by the Court. See
infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
59. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(1); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601(b)(1).
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issues that have been preserved in the courts below.60 That is,
the question must have been raised before appeal to the court.
Therefore, a litigant could not devise a frivolous constitutional
argument and raise it for the first time on appeal solely for the
purpose of obtaining an appeal as of right. Preservation rules
apply to appeals as of right.61 “[U]nless the constitutional
question was initially properly raised in the court of first
instance, it will not be reviewable by the [New York] Court of
Appeals.”62 To be sure, the court has stated that “it is better . . .
not to resolve constitutional questions unaddressed by the
lower courts.”63
In addition, on a direct appeal from a court of original
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals will consider only the
constitutional question.64 Therefore, it would not make sense to
manufacture a frivolous constitutional claim to create an
appeal, because the court will not address the other, nonconstitutional issues raised on the appeal.
To further safeguard against the stated concerns that
purport to justify the “substantiality requirement,” this
limitation on the court‟s review should also be extended to
appeals from appellate division judgments. Currently, on
appeals as of right from the appellate division, the court will
consider all questions properly within its jurisdiction, even
those that do not raise constitutional challenges.65 However, if
the court only reviewed the constitutional question, it would
negate any incentive for a litigant to invent a flimsy
constitutional argument just to gain an appeal. This would
address the concerns that purport to justify the substantiality
requirement without furnishing the court with discretion that
makes an appeal “as of right” illusory.
60. KARGER, supra note 15, § 14:1, at 495.
61. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 11, § 15:5; id. § 15:3.
62. KARGER, supra note 15, § 17:5, at 599.
63. Saratoga Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d
801, 825 (2003) (stating that is was better for the Court not to review a
constitutional question not discussed at trial court and only mentioned in
passing by the Appellate Division); see also KARGER, supra note 15, § 14:1, at
498.
64. KARGER, supra note 15, § 7:2, at 222 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §
3(b)(2)).
65. Id. § 7:2, at 223.
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Conclusion
The Court of Appeals‟ practice requiring that an appeal as
of right pursuant to CPLR 5601(b) raise a “substantial”
constitutional question is not loyal to the explicit text of the
CPLR or the New York State Constitution. Indeed, to the
extent that the requirement invokes discretion for the court to
determine which appeals on constitutional grounds to retain, it
subverts the basic structure of both the CPLR and the State
Constitution, which contemplate appeals as of right as distinct
from appeals that necessitate permission from the court.
The stated justification for the requirement of
“substantiality” is unsound and redundant of other existing
limitations on appealability and reviewability—namely, the
requirement that the constitutional question be directly
involved in deciding the case and the requirement that the
question be preserved for the court‟s review. Moreover, the
court will only review the constitutional challenges on a direct
appeal. If the court expanded this reviewability limitation to
appeals from the appellate division, it would significantly
eliminate the incentive for an aggrieved litigant to
manufacture a frivolous constitutional question in order to gain
the right to appeal—because the constitutional question is the
only issue the court would address on the appeal.
In sum, the judicially created policy of requiring
“substantiality” should be eliminated. There are existing and
sensible safeguards that do not require the court to furnish
itself with discretion that is not conferred by statute or
constitution.
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